i.

Collaborating with local media literacy organisations, as well as relevant associations, groups and networks, financially supporting, sharing and integrating election related initiatives and campaigns on the platform, including by developing joint initiatives. Local media literacy organisations represent a valuable resource in terms of knowledge of local contexts and target audiences. The Commission recommends the use of the network of EDMO and its hubs and the Commission’s Expert Group on Media Literacy to find the relevant organisations at Member State level.

ii.

Developing and applying inoculation measures that pre-emptively build resilience against possible and expected disinformation narratives and manipulation techniques by informing and preparing users. Such measures should take into account the specific local context where they are carried out and should be complemented by other measures providing reliable information to users. Inoculation measures can take different forms, including e.g., gamified interventions, such as participation in online games on the generation of disinformation which encourages a critical reflection on the tactics used to influence (25), video or other types of content (26), and where feasible, should be implemented in-app to foster ease of access.

iii.

When designing media literacy campaigns, it is recommended that providers of VLOPs or VLOSEs take into account specific narratives as well as tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that contribute to systemic risks that are likely to occur before, during and after an election, in line with the approach of adapting mitigation measures to the relevant national context and target audiences.

i.

Fact-checking labels on identified disinformation and FIMI content provided by independent fact-checkers and fact-checking teams of independent media organisations. Fact-checking coverage should extend across the EU and its languages, inter alia through strengthening the cooperation with local fact-checkers during election periods, integrating and showcasing election-related fact-checking content as well as employing mechanisms to help increase the impact of these on audiences. Fact-checking labels should be accessible and written in easily understandable language.

ii.

Prompts and nudges urging users to read content and evaluate its accuracy and source before sharing it.

iii.

Clear, visible, and non-deceptive indications of official accounts, as well as accounts providing authoritative information on the electoral process, such as the accounts of electoral authorities, including the basis on which such verification is established. The criteria that lead to an “official” label for an account should be made easily available and provided in easily understandable language, to prevent such indications from giving credibility to accounts impersonating official accounts, such as those of electoral authorities.

iv.

Clear, visible, and non-deceptive labelling of accounts controlled by Member States, third countries and entities controlled or financed by entities controlled by third countries.

v.

Tools and information to help users assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as trust marks focused on the integrity of the source based on transparent methodologies and developed by independent third parties.

vi.

Other tools to assess the provenance, edit history, authenticity, or accuracy of digital content. These help users to check the authenticity or identify the provenance or source of content related to elections.

vii.

Establish effective internal measures to counter misuse of any of the above procedures and tools, in particular the abuse of the verification process for labelled accounts and content.

i.

Ensuring that recommender systems are designed and adjusted in a way that gives users meaningful choices and controls over their feeds, with due regard to media diversity and pluralism;

ii.

Establishing measures to reduce the prominence of disinformation in the context of elections based on clear and transparent methods, e.g. regarding deceptive content that has been fact-checked as false or coming from accounts that have been repeatedly found to spread disinformation;

iii.

Establishing measures to limit the amplification of deceptive, false or misleading content generated by AI in the context of elections through their recommender systems;

iv.

Regularly assessing the performance and impact of recommender systems and addressing any emerging risks or issues related to electoral processes, including by updating and refining policies, practices, and algorithms;

v.

Establishing measures to provide transparency around the design and functioning of recommender systems, in particular in relation to the data and information used in designing systems that foster media pluralism and diversity of content, to facilitate third party scrutiny and research;

vi.

Engaging with external parties to conduct adversarial testing and red team exercises on these systems to identify potential risks such as risks stemming from biases, susceptibility to manipulation, or amplification of misinformation, disinformation, FIMI or other harmful content.

i.

Provide users with information about the political advertisements they see, such as the sponsor identity and, where applicable, the entity ultimately controlling the sponsor; the period during which the political advertisement is intended to be published, delivered or disseminated; the aggregated amounts and the aggregated value of other benefits received by the providers of political advertising services; as well as meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is presented.

ii.

Maintain a publicly available, searchable repository of political ads, updated in as close as possible to real-time. This shall include, as a minimum, the total number of recipients of the service reached and, where applicable, the aggregate numbers broken down by Member State for the group or groups of recipients that the advertisement specifically targeted, as mandated by Article 39 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, and could also include e.g., the aggregated amounts and the aggregated value of other benefits received by the providers, the number of impressions and the geographical areas in which the ad was presented.

iii.

When they do not allow political advertising on their services, have efficient verification systems in place and take the necessary actions to ensure that the decision is appropriately enforced.

iv.

Ensure that there are adequate policies and systems in place to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate misleading information, disinformation and FIMI with regards to electoral processes, including deceptive generative AI content.

i.

Provide a functionality to allow influencers to declare whether the content they provide is or contains political advertising, including the sponsor identity and, where applicable, the entity ultimately controlling the sponsor; the period during which the political advertisement is intended to be published, delivered or disseminated; the aggregated amounts and the aggregated value of other benefits received by the providers of political advertising services; display period, as well as meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is presented.

ii.

Ensure that other recipients of the service can identify in a clear, salient and unambiguous manner and in real time, including through prominent labelling, that the content provided is or contains political advertising, as described in the influencer’s declaration.

i.

The Commission recommends that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs develop and enforce their rules, preventing deception through impersonation of candidates, the deployment of deceptive manipulated media, the use of fake engagements, non-transparent paid messages, or non-transparent promotion by influencers, as well as coordination of inauthentic content creation or behaviour.

ii.

The Commission recommends cooperation between the relevant teams of different providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs to identify common threats and to counter cross-platform disinformation campaigns, FIMI activity or hateful, (violent) extremist or radicalising activity that can influence individuals in their electoral choices and migration of malicious actors (see section 3.4 on cooperation with national authorities, independent experts, and civil society organisations).

i.

The Commission recommends that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs provide clear public information on which internal processes and mitigation measures, such as labelling, marking, demoting or removing, are in place to enforce these policies;

ii.

The Commission recommends that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs cooperate and share information about such deceptive content with fact checkers to ensure that the risk of amplification in other platforms is minimised.

i.

The Commission recommends that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs provide users with standard and easy to use interfaces and tools to add labels to AI generated content;

ii.

When labelling generative AI content, the Commission recommends that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs apply efficient labels, easily recognised by users, taking into account aspects such as graphics, position and timing, drawing on scientific research on the effectiveness of labels (31). Providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs should also test the effectiveness of such labels before release and adapt and improve them based on feedback and experience;

iii.

The Commission recommends that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs make sure the labelled generative AI content retains its label once it is shared by other users on the platform.

i.

In this context, providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs should cooperate with providers of generative AI systems and follow leading state of the art measures to ensure that such watermarks, metadata identifications, cryptographic methods for proving provenance and authenticity of content, logging methods, fingerprints or other techniques are detected in a reliable and effective manner; they are also recommended to support new technology innovations to improve the effectiveness and interoperability of such tools.